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le1 Intro
Prediction markets are a relatively new form of financial market (Oliven and Rietz, 2004), in which traders
buy and sell contracts that are bets on specific future events. The price of a contract is fully determined by
supply and demand in the market. Prediction market prices are viewed by some as a mechanism to retrieve
and aggregate all private and relevant information for estimating the underlying event’s probability, which
in turn can be a useful input for a decision maker (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006a).
For example, a contract on an election may consist of a bet on the following event: ‘Candidate A will
win the election.’ Buying a contract is betting on the occurrence of the event, while selling the contract is
betting against it. Traders buy and sell contracts at market price p ∈ [0, 1]. If the event occurs, the buyer
receives 1 from the seller, and zero otherwise.1
Interest in prediction markets stems from the fact that the market price of a contract can be viewed
as an estimate of the probability of the underlying event. For example, Gjerstad (2005) and Wolfers and
Zitzewitz (2006b) show that if traders have conventional utility functions with limited risk aversion (i.e., the
utility functions are roughly linear over the range of the values considered), the equilibrium price is a good
approximation of the mean of the belief distribution of traders on the likelihood of the event. When traders
are risk averse with logarithmic utility functions, a general result from the research in finance on asset pricing
with heterogeneous beliefs is that the asset price should be the arithmetic mean of the distribution of belief
of the traders (Rubinstein, 1976).
If the traders’ beliefs about the event probability are well calibrated on average, then a market price may
be considered as an estimate of the event probability. By ‘calibrated’ we mean that on average, when the
trader’s belief is p, the expected frequency of the corresponding outcome occurring is p. The same definition
will be used to define calibrated market prices; a market price is calibrated when the expected frequency of
occurrence equals the price.
In this paper, we look at the ability of prediction markets to estimate the probability of a future event
outcome that will not be known for one month or more. Such longer-term prediction markets are most
1The ‘currency’ used in the transactions can be thought of as tokens. For example, Intrade’s currency unit is a point; one
point equals $0.10. On betting exchanges like Betfair, the price of assets is presented in the form of odds. In spite of the
difference in presentation, the underlying mechanisms of traditional prediction markets and betting exchanges are similar. The
analysis we develop here for prediction markets apply similarly to betting exchanges.
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le relevant for decision makers who must make decisions well before the uncertainties in the underlying eventsare resolved. In large organisations, decisions and their implementation take time. To be most useful in an
organisational setting, prediction markets should be able to provide calibrated probabilities well in advance
of the future event.
This paper is the first to take into account the time dimension when modelling the equilibrium price in
a prediction market. Until now, prediction market prices have been considered (at least implicitly) to be as
accurate in the short term as in the long term. In this paper, we show that the time dimension can play an
important role in the calibration of the market price.When traders who have time discounting preferences
receive no interest on the funds committed to a prediction-market contract, a cost is induced, with the result
that traders with beliefs near the market price abstain from participation in the market. This abstention is
more pronounced for the favourite because the higher price of a favourite contract requires a larger money
commitment from the trader and hence a larger cost due to the trader’s preference for the present. Under
general conditions on the distribution of beliefs on the market, this produces a bias of the price toward 50%,
similar to the so-called favourite/longshot bias.2
We confirm this prediction using a data set of actual prediction markets prices from 1,787 market repre-
senting a total of more than 500,000 transactions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, in §2 we discuss the factors which may influence
the calibration of prediction markets and the relevant theoretical and empirical research. In §3 we model
the effect of time discounting preferences on market prices. We show that traders’ decisions to invest in
prediction markets are influenced by the market duration, resulting in prices that display a longshot bias. In
§4 we describe our dataset of transaction prices for prediction markets lasting more than one month. The
size of our dataset allows us in §5 to use nonparametric estimation methods to calculate local estimates of
market price miscalibration. In particular, we are able to study the calibration of market prices near 0 or 1
with more precision than previous researchers have been able to achieve. §6 presents an economic analysis of
the data; we show that accounting for the time value of money affects the ability to exploit the systematic
bias in prices. §7 discusses the results and concludes.
2For convenience we will hereafter use the term “longshot bias” to refer to the combination favourite/longshot bias.
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The calibration of prediction markets’ estimates has been one of the main questions investigated by previous
prediction market research. Such research has identified several possible reasons why prices could be biased
or miscalibrated, systematically departing from the event probability.
First, in the case of risk neutral traders with limited budgets, a longshot bias, when the prices are biased
toward 1/2 (see for instance Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2009, 2010a) can arise even if their beliefs are well
calibrated. The reason for this is that the market clearing condition typically requires that the price be
located not at the median of the distribution of traders’ beliefs but at a percentile closer to 1/2 than the
median (Ali, 1977; Manski, 2006). Extending this framework, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2010b) examine a
fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium, in which traders make correct inferences from prices, given
common knowledge of the information structure and prior beliefs. They find that, even in this situation, the
price underreacts to new information, thereby leading to prices biased toward 1/2.
Second, if traders are not risk neutral but risk averse, as in Gjerstad (2005), Wolfers and Zitzewitz
(2006b), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2010b), traders’ risk aversion can automatically create a longshot bias.
However, the bias would be small if traders’ risk aversion falls within the range typically observed in empirical
studies.
Third, when prediction market prices play a role in the decision processes of individuals or organisations,
there may be an incentive for some agents to manipulate the market by buying or selling contracts in order
to move the price up or down. What role might manipulators play in shaping prediction market prices?
Results from theoretical and empirical studies are mixed on this issue. Hanson and Oprea (2008) propose
a model in which manipulation causes prediction market prices to be better calibrated due to the liquidity
they provide. However, in the more general discussion of manipulation of prices of financial assets, seminal
work of Allen and Gale (1992) shows that manipulation can affect financial market prices even with rational
traders. On the empirical side, some experimental studies find prediction markets to be resilient with respect
to manipulation (Camerer, 1998; Rhode and Strumpf, 2006; Hanson et al., 2006). However, Hansen et al.
(2004) report successful attempts at manipulating prices in the Iowa Electronic Market.
Fourth, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2007) show how a prediction market can create an incentive to manipulate
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separated from the measured probability, as the creation of the prediction market may foster manipulation
of the outcome, thereby affecting the probability of the event.
Fifth, evidence from behavioural finance suggests that traders are subject to biases when estimating
subjective probabilities and making decisions about financial transactions. Thus, one might expect prices
emerging from traders’ average beliefs to be systematically biased as well. In particular, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) propose a model of decision making in which individuals weight probabilities when making
decisions. Small probabilities are typically overweighted and large probabilities underweighted. Thaler and
Ziemba (1988) suggest that this is the main reason for the presence of longshot bias in prediction markets.
Sixth, relatively recent psychological studies have shown that subjective probabilities may display partition
dependence. Fox and Clemen (2005) define partition dependence as ‘the tendency for judged probabilities to
vary systematically with the way a state space is partitioned into events for which probabilities are assessed.’
This phenomenon is due, according to Fox and Clemen (2005), to the fact that ‘people anchor their judgements
on equal probabilities for each event in the specified partition (the ignorance prior distribution) and adjust
insufficiently to account for their beliefs about how the likelihood of the events differ.’ Sobel and Raines (2003)
propose an information model in which Bayesian bettors begin with an ignorance prior (equal probabilities)
and update the prior according to private information. As a result, longshots are overestimated and favourites
underestimated. Sonnemann et al. (2007) find an ignorance prior bias in experimental prediction markets
and some suggestive evidence of it in real prediction markets.
While these elements tend to suggest that market prices may not be good estimates of underlying proba-
bilities, Oliven and Rietz (2004) argue and provide some evidence that prediction market prices are primarily
determined by a minority of active traders, the so-called ‘market makers.’ They find that these traders tend
to behave more rationally than others. For this reason an efficient price could emerge from a set of biased
traders.
This paper contributes to this literature by showing that the time dimension plays a critical role in the
calibration of the prediction market prices, limiting the ability of prediction markets to provide calibrated
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3 Model
Previous papers have implicitly assumed that a trader’s investment decision is a one-period problem (Manski,
2006; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006b; Gjerstad, 2005; Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2010b). However, this assump-
tion is inadequate for studying prediction markets in which a significant amount of time can elapse between
the purchase of a contract and the final resolution of the uncertainty. In these cases, the time value of money
should be taken into account. We might also expect that a trader who derives some utility from gambling
might prefer not to commit a significant amount of money over a long period (Diecidue et al., 2004); do-
ing so would further constrain the amount of money available for subsequent gambling activity during the
corresponding period.
To model the trader’s choice, we introduce a time dimension into the framework proposed by Manski
(2006) which is the prediction market equivalent of the framework proposed by Ali (1977) for racetrack
betting. In this framework, a risk-neutral trader with budget y has the opportunity to purchase some
quantity of a single contract. The trader’s problem is to choose a quantity x of contracts to maximize her
profit, given the contract price p and her belief q that the contract will be successful. The trader chooses to
invest xp from her budget y. At resolution, the contract yields a value 0 or 1. Given that the trader has a
belief q that the contract will be successful, her expected gain is qx.3 In previous models, time plays no role.
It is as if the contract’s value is revealed to the trader as soon as the contract is purchased. To capture the
time dimension of prediction markets, suppose that the outcome of the contract takes place later in time.
We introduce (the inverse of) a time discounting factor β > 1 in the utility function of the trader such that
contracts that are resolved later in time have a lower utility, x/β.
3In line with previous literature, we take belief as a primitive. Traders can update their prior beliefs with the market prices
they can observe. We do not model explictly how traders update their prior with market prices (Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2010b,
for example). We analyse the consistency between prices and (posterior) beliefs. We thank a reviewer for stressing this point.
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le Thus, the trader solves maxx V (x) = y − xp+ q xβ
s.t. xp ≤ y
. (1)
For convenience, we model the seller as a trader who buys the reverse contract. Imagine a market maker
who simultaneously sells the original contract to those who want to buy, and sells the reverse contract to
those who want to sell the original contract. For the market maker, the equilibrium price not only equates
supply and demand, but it also balances the books, putting the right amount of money on each side of the
bet so that the market maker can transfer all of the money to the side that wins the bet. If the market
maker takes a commission from each bettor, then the market maker is called a bookie. Thus a seller solves
the problem
maxx V (x) = y − x(1− p) + (1− q) xβ
s.t. x ≤ y
. (2)
In this framework there are only two relevant periods for the trader: the period where the decision to
buy or sell the contract is made and the period where the final outcome of the contract is revealed. This is a
simplistic representation of reality as in practice traders can continuously change their market positions. It
is, however, the simplest extension of existing models that assume that traders only take into account their
beliefs of the final probability of the event.
The introduction of the time dimension has two effects. First, it reduces the potential number of traders
willing to participate in the market:
PROPOSITION 1. If traders solve (2), any value of β > 1 results in a region 1− (1− p1)β < q < p1β, such
that any trader whose belief q falls within this region neither buys nor sells the contract.
Proof. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KTC) for a trader who buys the contract imply that she invests all
of her budget y to buy if q > pβ and invests nothing if q < pβ.
The KTC for a seller imply that she will buy the reverse contract if 1−q > (1−p)β, that is if q < 1−(1−p)β.
When β > 1, 1− (1− p)β < pβ. Thus, the no-trade region is 1− (1− p)β < q < pβ. 2
From Proposition 1, it is evident that, as β increases, the no-trade region expands. Figure 1 shows
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Fig. 1: Regions of No Trade with Discounting
How does this affect the market price? In the most general case, it is possible to define boundaries for
the market price as a function of β:
PROPOSITION 2. If traders solve (1) and (2), and if F is the distribution of beliefs q of the traders, the
market price is such that:
F [1− (1− p)β] < 1− p < F (pβ)
Proof. The market clearing condition is:
1∫
pβ
y
p
f(q)dq =
1−(1−p)β∫
0
y
1− pf(q)dq. (3)
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le This reduces to: (1− p)[1− F (pβ)] = pF [1− (1− p)β]The proposition can be proven by contradiction. Suppose 1−p < F [1− (1−p)β], then F [1− (1−p)β][1−
F (pβ)] > pF [1− (1− p)β], and as a consequence F (pβ) < 1− p < F [1− (1− p)β].
However, when β is strictly greater than 1, 1− (1− p)β < p < pβ, which implies that F (1− (1− p)β) ≤
F (p) ≤ F (pβ). Hence F (1− (1− p)β) ≤ F (pβ), which contradicts the previous result. 2
When β 7−→ 1, the model is identical to the one proposed by Manski (2006). The following results can
be established:
COROLLARY 3. Let β = 1 in (2) and let F be the the cumulative distribution function of beliefs of the
traders. The equilibrium price p satisfies the condition
p = 1− F (p)
This proposition is established by Ali (1977) (equation 4) and Manski (2006) (equation 1).
PROPOSITION 4. Let β = 1 in (2). The equilibrium price p differs from the median m of the distribution
of beliefs F :
i If p ≥ 1/2, then p ≤ m;
ii If p ≤ 1/2, then p ≥ m.
This proposition corresponds to Theorem 2 of Ali (1977). It shows that in a one period model, the
equilibrium price in a prediction market may not represent the underlying median belief of the traders.
Thus, a longshot bias may exist with risk neutral traders.
It is possible to go further and to predict how the market price is likely to be influenced by an increase
in β. In general, the no-trade region is not symmetric around p. Specifically, the no-trade region is larger
above the price when the price is high and larger below the price when the price is low. This is likely to
create an imbalance between supply and demand. For high prices, for example, potential buyers are more
likely to abstain than potential sellers, because the no-trade area is larger above the price than below. The
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prices below 50%.
The following gives a sufficient condition regarding the distribution of beliefs for the no-trade region to
be asymmetric as described above:
CONDITION 5. Let f be the density function of the distribution of beliefs on the possible prices and p1 be
the actual equilibrium price on the market when β = 1.
i. If p1 > 1/2, f
′(p1) > 0.
ii. If p1 < 1/2, f
′(p1) < 0.
Any unimodal distribution symmetric around m is consistent with Condition 5 (this class includes for
instance many kernel functions). Proposition 4 implies that for a unimodal and symmetric distribution of
beliefs, the price p will be between the median m of the distribution and 1/2. It is trivial to see that Condition
5 is respected in such situations.
PROPOSITION 6. If traders solve 1 and 2, and if Condition 5 holds, an increase in β in the neighborhood
of 1 increases the price if m < p < 1/2 and decreases the price if 1/2 < p < m
Proof From the market equilibrium condition, write the difference between demand and supply as:
Φ =
1∫
pβ
y
p
f(q)dq −
1−(1−p)β∫
0
y
1− pf(q)dq = 0 . (4)
Using the implicit function theorem,
dp
dβ
= −
dΦ
dβ
dΦ
dp
.
The effect of an increase in price on the market balance is unambiguous: dΦdp ≤ 0. The derivative dpdβ has the
sign of
dΦ
dβ
= f (1− (1− p)β)− f (pβ) . (5)
Condition 5 implies that for β = 1 + ε with ε small and positive, f (pβ) > f (1− (1− p)β) if p > 1/2 and
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le symmetrically f (pβ) < f (1− (1− p)β) if p < 1/2.An increase in the discount factor for values close to 1 will therefore lead to an increase in the longshot
bias. 2
Proposition 6 may be intuitively explained by the effect of the disappearance of trade. With an increase
in β, the no-trade region expands around the price p. Under Condition 5, when p > 1/2, the decrease in
demand is larger than the decrease in supply, leading to a drop in price. Conversely, when p < 1/2, the
decrease in supply is larger than the decrease in demand, leading to an increase in price.
It is important to stress that the technical Condition 5 is consistent with a wide range of belief distribu-
tions. Condition 5 holds for unimodal distributions on [0, 1] that have positive skewness when the median
m of the distribution is above 1/2, and a negative skewness when m is below 1/2. This case includes, for
instance, all beta distributions FB(a, b) with a > 1, b > 1. Moreover, as saw above, Proposition 4 ensures
that any unimodal distribution symmetric around m is consistent with Condition 5.
In order to check that this result is robust to risk-averse utility functions and different levels of discounting,
we performed a series of market-price simulations as a function of the mean beliefs of the traders and the
discounting parameter β. We created fictitious markets with 10,000 traders having beliefs distributed as F (q)
and a specified utility function and discount factor β. We considered risk neutral and log utility functions.
Beliefs were distributed according to a Beta distribution B(µ, 1− µ) where µ = E(q) represents the traders’
mean beliefs. The discount parameters chosen (β = 1.1 and 1.2) are in the range of the values found in the
empirical literature (Andersen et al., 2008). A numerical algorithm calculated the market clearing price. All
simulations show the same effect of discounting on prices (Figure 2). Discounting systematically distorts the
equilibrium price, with the anticipated stronger effect for prices near zero or one.
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Fig. 2: Simulation of Market Prices with Traders who are Risk Neutral (Left) and Risk Averse with Log
Utility Functions (Right)
4 Data
Empirical analysis of long term prediction markets (expiration beyond one month) is complicated by the
fact that such markets are much less prevalent than short-term markets. For example, markets for U. S.
presidential elections may open years before election day, but only six U.S. Presidential elections have taken
place since the creation of the Iowa Electronic Markets in 1988. For this reason, empirical studies of long-
term prediction markets have so far relied primarily on relatively small samples. Several such studies have
found that the prices in such prediction markets are in general not far from the empirical probability of the
underlying event (Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006a). However, the small sample
sizes in these studies result in low levels of precision. In particular, while the theory may predict some specific
miscalibration for some range of prices, including prices near 0 or 1, the theory cannot be adequately tested
without a precise local estimation procedure that in turn requires a large dataset.
Our dataset includes transactions from 1,883 Intrade markets on future events. These markets are often
linked to other markets in what we call a competition, in which the outcomes of the markets are interde-
pendent. For instance if two candidates are vying for a Senate seat, then the two markets (one for each
candidate) constitute a competition; they are bound to each other by the fact that only one candidate can
win. Our data also contain few markets for state level results of a given election (e.g. ‘GW Bush wins in
Florida in 2004’ and ‘GW Bush wins in Virginia in 2004’). We consider them as not independent from each
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contracts on a future event are exchanged (e.g., ‘Candidate A will win the 2004 U.S. presidential election’).
A competition is a set of interdependent markets (e.g., ‘2004 presidential election’). A contract is an asset
exchanged in a market. The contract is linked to the realization of a particular outcome of a specified future
event. If the indicated outcome occurs, the contract’s value is 1, and zero otherwise. A transaction occurs
when two traders exchange a specified number of contracts at a given price between 0 and 1.
Our raw dataset contains data for 1,883 markets and 512,828 transactions. From this raw sample we
eliminated markets with very low liquidity (less than 5 observations, or a total volume of less than 10
contracts). We gathered markets in competitions of interdependent markets, leaving us with a final dataset
of 597 competitions, 1787 markets, and 512,612 transactions. Low liquidity may create several problems,
but for our purposes low liquidity implies few traders and volatile prices. In either case, price data from such
markets may not represent traders’ median beliefs with adequate precision Christiansen (2007).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All markets Sport markets Political markets Other markets
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Vol. per transaction 24.17 1 1687 29.51 1 1687 14.29 1 564 17.75 1 120
Vol. per contract 115176.37 16 1550189 188137.55 16 1236944 15635.79 19 1550189 2184.84 17 32704
Nb obs per contract 5014.12 5 67547 7942.98 5 67547 1486.18 5 62956 142.71 5 2609
Price 22.18 0.10 99.90 16.20 0.10 99.90 39.23 0.10 98.80 25.08 0.10 95.00
Duration 205.00 27 649 236.38 36 431 256.55 33 649 42.00 27 107
Nb of transactions 512612 336575 140041 35996
Nb of competitions 597 241 142 214
Nb of contracts 1787 1064 302 421
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for our dataset, including subsets of sports, political, and
other4 markets. Figure 3 shows a histogram of market prices for the entire dataset. Many markets are
from competitions with more than two possible outcomes, resulting in a distribution of prices that is skewed
toward zero. Because only one outcome is possible, more markets end with a final price of zero than a final
price of 1.
4The ”other market” category includes a variety of different markets, such as markets on financial or economic events or
other popular events such as the Academy Awards or reality TV shows.
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Fig. 3: Distribution of Prices
5 Statistical Analysis
5.1 Analysis Principles
In this section, we focus on the empirical estimation of the calibration of the market prices5 Let A be a state
of nature taken from the set A of all possible states of nature. Let y be the final value of the contract on a
given market, y ∈ {0, 1}. A well calibrated market price is defined by
p|A = E(y|A). (6)
When market prices are well calibrated according to (6),they are accurate estimates of the probability of the
contract’s success. This relation cannot be tested directly, though, because E(y|A) is unknown. However,
every market has a resolution of the underlying event, and hence prices can be compared to the corresponding
5We stress that we do not address the calibration of the traders as such. We do not study the distribution of traders beliefs
but only the link between prices and observed probabilities.
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p = E(y|p). (7)
If the price is a calibrated estimate of the probability, contracts exchanged at a given price should, on
average, yield a result equal to that price. Said differently, when buying a contract at a price p, the probability
of success of the contract should be p. If the price departs systematically from the probability of the event,
observed prices will not satisfy Equation 7 uniformly. If there is a longshot bias, prices will be too high for
low probabilities and too low for high probabilities:
p > E(y) for p ∈ [0, p0],
p < E(y) for p ∈ [p1, 1],
(8)
for some 0 < p0 ≤ p1 < 1. As above, (8) cannot be tested directly. However, it is possible to estimate E(y|p),
and (8) implies:
p > E(y|p) for p ∈ [0, p0],
p < E(y|p) for p ∈ [p1, 1].
(9)
To assess the calibration of market prices, we estimate the empirical probability associated with each price,
E(y|p), using both parametric and nonparametric techniques.
The principle of this analysis, relying on the comparison of E(y|p) to p, systematizes previous approaches
in the study of the calibration of odds on betting markets and prices on prediction markets (Coleman, 2004).
Initial studies of the longshot bias in horserace betting used the ranks of starters, ranking starters by their
odds (derived from bets placed before the race) and numbering them from 1 to N (Griffith, 1949; Ali, 1977;
Bird et al., 1987; Terrell, 1998). For each rank, the observed relative frequency of winning is compared to the
probability of winning as derived from the odds. A discrepancy between the relative frequency of winning and
the odds-based probability (violation of (7)) indicates miscalibration, and systematic miscalibration suggests
a bias. A difficulty with this approach is that starters with identical ranks may have quite different odds.
The binning of starters by rank can result in substantial variance in odds-based probabilities within each
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Williams and Paton, 1997) and compare the implied probabilities p to the relative-frequency-based estimates
of E(y|p). A problem with this solution is that each race includes several starters but only one winning
outcome. Using the odds of all the horses in the race can lead to a spurious analysis, e.g., when two horses
from a given race are placed in the same bin (Busche and Hall, 1988). The outcomes (winning or losing) for
each of these horses are by definition not independent events.
The binning approach has also been used to analyze prediction markets by placing contracts with similar
prices into the same bin. Such studies face the same problem of nonindependence of contracts within one
market.
In the present paper, we use a nonparametric local linear regression to estimate E(y|p). Our approach
provides precise estimates, even for very high and very low probabilities. An innovation of our empirical
strategy is the use of a clustered bootstrap to account for the nonindependence of contracts within markets
whose outcomes are dependent (e.g., all markets linked to one election). Using groups of nonindependent
markets as clusters in a bootstrap resampling, we are able to estimate a confidence interval for the entire
calibration curve.
We also use a parametric estimation procedure to study factors that may influence price calibration.
We use a clustered bootstrap here as well, allowing us to calculate accurate conficence intervals for the
parameters.
The computation of a confidence interval by clustered bootstrap allows to keep all the information in the
dataset while controlling for the non independence of prices within clusters. It is a significant improvement
relative to the previous literature.
5.2 Nonparametric Estimation
5.2.1 Methodology
With a large number of observations, it is possible to calculate a local estimate of the conditional expectation
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also more accurate than kernel regression for transaction prices at the high and low extremes, a property that
is important for our analysis. (For a description of the boundary problem with nonparametric estimators,
see Ha¨rdle (1992)).
The local regression estimator estimates a local regression line for each price p, by estimating a constant
parameter β0(p) and a slope parameter β1(p). To do so, the following program is solved:
min
β0,β1
n∑
i=1
Kh(p− pi) (yi − β0 − β1(pi − p))2 ,
where pi represents the i
th of n observations used in the estimation; h is the width of an estimation window
around p; and Kh is a kernel (i.e., a weighting function) defined by
6:
Kh(p− pi) = 3
4
(
1−
(
p− pi
h
)2)
1{|p−pi|≤h}
The smaller the window size h, the more flexible the estimation. As the size of the window decreases,
though, the variance of the estimated curve increases. Thus, the choice of window width requires a tradeoff
between the flexibility of the estimation and the smoothness of the estimated curve. We use a window width
of 0.10. This allows for a flexible estimation but with a reasonably small variance. The estimator of E(y|p)
is then given by
Ê(y|p) = β̂0
Formally, this estimator is equivalent to a local weighted average of the dependent variable y ∈ {0, 1}(Fan,
1993). In order to assess the precision of this nonparametric estimation, we calculate a confidence interval
for each of 99 prices (0.01 to 0.99). The calculation follows the technique proposed by Ha¨rdle (1992), using
a clustered bootstrap approach. Because of the nonindependence of the prices within each competition,
we use competitions as our clusters. For example, if there are five separate markets, one for each possible
6In all of our estimations we use an Epanechnikov kernel. The estimations are, however, not sensitive to the particular kernel
chosen.
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addition, all markets associated with the 2004 Democratic primaries were considered to be a separate single
competition.
There are huge variations in the number of transactions across competitions. Some, like the US presidency,
have tens of thousands of transactions, and others have only a few dozen. Because of this disparity, for each
point from 0.01 to 0.99 we randomly select 10 transactions (prices) per competition, for a total of n = 6020
transactions. Doing so avoids giving too large a weight in the estimation to large competitions7.
5.2.2 Results - overall calibration
Figure 4 shows the results of the nonparametric estimation of the calibration of prediction market prices.
The heavy dashed line is computed as the average of the different estimates, while the gray shaded area is
the confidence interval computed by the clustered bootstrap procedure with 400 replications. The S-shaped
curve indicates a clear longshot bias. For example, a price of 0.20 is on average associated with a relative
frequency of 15.3%; conversely, a price of 0.80 is on average associated with a relative frequency of 87.4%.
These results indicate miscalibration at a considerably higher level than reported previously for short-term
markets.
Noticeably, this S-shaped curve does not present a bias at the very extreme prices towards 0 and 1 similar
to our simulations displayed in Figure 2. In our results, prices seem, at the limit, well calibrated in 0 and
1, while it is not the case in our simulations. Our model does not explain this particular feature of the
bias in prices’ calibration. As a matter of fact, our model is unable to explain prices close to extremes as it
predicts that the liquidity disappears on the markets in such situations. For instance, for prices close to 1,
no traders are willing to buy long term contracts when their beliefs are between p and pβ > p. For a given
level of time discounting β, there is a maximum price which can be observed on the market in our model:
p∗ = 1/β. Above this price, there is no more trader willing to buy the contract. Interestingly, this is not what
7To estimate the confidence interval by bootstrap, in each iteration we draw new samples of prices for each contract. As can
be seen from the narrow intervals in Figure 4, randomly choosing prices results in little variation in the point estimate.
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Fig. 4: Nonparametric Estimation of the Calibration Curve
is observed in our estimation where a S-shape curve is observed. One possibility is that, unlike in our simple
model, there is an heterogeneity in discount factors in the population of traders. In such a situation, traders
with the lowest discounting factors will be the only one trading in the extreme ranges of prices, hence leading
to a smaller level of bias in these areas. This explanation is however not entirely satisfying as no rational
trader should have a time discounting factor lower than the interest rate in the economy. Another solution is
that some traders have non-economic motive such as a preference to gamble, possibly a preference to gamble
on specific events. Some traders may also have a preference on the level of the price itself if they want the
market price to give a signal to third parties (other traders, general public, media). Whilst these traders
with non economic motives may not be very numerous, they could be the only ones left on the market in the
extreme ranges of prices for long term prediction markets. Trades above the economically rational threshold
p∗ from our model could then typically produce a calibration curves in S, as the possible distance between
the upper (lower) bound of the calibration curve and the 45 degree line is necessarily decreasing as we get
closer from prices close to one (zero). This could give the impression that the prices are better calibrated at
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5.2.3 Results - variations in miscalibration across markets
To go further, we can consider variables potentially related to miscalibration. Looking across three different
categories of competitions (sports, political, other) and ignoring the time dimension, we find a meaningful
difference only when comparing political to non-political competitions. Figure 5 shows the nonparametric
estimations for these two categories. Market prices for political events show a very strong longshot bias, while
the other markets are only slightly miscalibrated. The extent of the bias in political markets is noticeably
greater than the overall results in Figure 4. Here, for a price of 0.20, the relative frequency of the event
occurring is 10.9%, and for a price of 0.80, the relative frequency is 92.8%.
Fig. 5: Nonparametric Results for Political and non Political Markets
To our knowledge, no reason is given in the literature to explain why political prediction markets would
show a stronger longshot bias. A possible explanation could be the existence of more manipulative traders
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5.2.4 Evolution of price calibration over time
Following the results of section 2, one should expect that price calibration worsens as time to contract
expiration increases. To test this nonparametrically, we divided the sample between prices with more or
less than 100 days left to expiration. Figure 6 shows the overall result, and Figure 7 shows the result when
looking specifically at the categories of political and nonpolitical markets (upper panels) and when spliting
the non political markets between sport ones and non sport ones (lower panels). The subdivision of the
sample in smaller subsample increase the variance of the estimates, in particular for prices observed more
than 100 days before maturity. However, overall the results are consistent with our model’s predictions; the
longshot bias is stronger for the longer time horizon, and the effect appears to hold for both political and
non-political markets.
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Fig. 6: Calibration of Prices over Different Times to Expiration
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Fig. 7: Calibration of Prices over Different Times to Expiration, by Market Type
© 2012 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2012 Royal Economic Society
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le 5.3 Parametric Estimation
5.3.1 General methodology
In order to model a possible non linear relationship between observed prices and empirical frequencies, we
use the Lattimore et al. (1992) function which is adapted to model the S curve that one could expect from
a longshot bias. This function allows for the calibration curve to be systematically below the 45 degre line
before a crossing point and above the 45 degree line after this crossing point. The function is characterised
by two parameters: γ which controls the curvature and δ which controls the crossing point:
p =
δpiγ
δpiγ + (1− pi)γ . (10)
In this expression, γ = 1 implies no curvature (the function corresponds to the 45◦ line), and δ = 1 implies
a crossing point of 0.5. The function is invertible:
pi =
1
(δ(1− p)/p)1/γ + 1 . (11)
As a result one can estimate parameters γ and δ using maximum likelihood. Given the nonindependence of
the prices (observations), though, the product of likelihoods over all observations is a pseudo-likelihood. Let
Y be a binary variable indicating the success of contract i, Yi ∈ {0, 1}. The pseudo likelihood PL is:
PL =
∏
i
(
1
(δ(1− p)/p)1/γ + 1
)Yi (
1− 1
(δ(1− p)/p)1/γ + 1
)1−Yi
. (12)
Following the same principles as above, these estimations are performed with a small number of observa-
tions (n = 10) selected randomly from each competition. As before, this procedure ensures that the results
are not driven by a few competitions that have a large number of transactions. Also as above, in order
to compute confidence intervals we use a clustered bootstrap with the competitions as clusters. For each
bootstrap sample we draw a new set of observations within each competition to ensure that our results do
not depend on a specific selection of transactions within each competition.
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Table 2 presents the results for the maximization of the pseudo-likelihood (12). The first column shows the
results when γ is assumed to be a constant. The results indicate that the estimate of δ is not significantly
different from 1, in turn indicating that the crossing point is not significantly different from 0.5. However,
γ is significantly different from 1, indicating a significant curvature of the calibration curve, confirming the
nonparametric results.
Table 2: Estimation of the PL model
Models
Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4)
µ
Constant‡ 0.94∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 0.95∗∗ 0.96∗∗
γ
Constant‡ 0.80∗∗∗∗ 0.88
∗∗ 0.98∗∗ 0.94∗∗
Time left to expiration −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗
Sport −0.09 −0.10
Politics −0.33∗ −0.35∗
Volume > 0.01
Volume total > 0.01
N competitions 597 597 597 597
N prices 512,612 512,612 512,612 512,612
Significant at † 10%, ∗ 5%, ∗ 1%, ∗∗∗ 0.1%.
‡ Test of significance relative to one is indicated in subscript.
CI calculated by clustered bootstraps
with the independent competitions as clusters
In columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2, the hypothesis that γ is a constant is relaxed to study whether the
curvature of the calibration function varies across different categories of contracts. To accomplish this, we
replace the constant γ with a linear function of potential explanatory variables. We first include the time
left to expiration. This variable is negative and significant, indicating that γ decreases as time to contract
expiration increases; the lower γ implies more curvature in equation (10). This confirms our model’s prediction
regarding traders’ discounting of future winnings and the corresponding result in the nonparamatric analysis
above. In column 3, we add variables to indicate the event categories sports (241 competitions, 1064
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only one that is significant, confirming the nonparametric result that political markets display a stronger
longshot bias than non-political markets. The coefficient for the time left to expiration remains negative and
significant.
In column 4, we include two variables related to market volume, volume per transaction (number of
contracts, recorded for each transaction price) and the total volume of the market (total number of contracts
traded, recorded for each market). Greater volume per transaction suggests traders more willing to trade
on their information, and larger market volume suggests more traders. Taken together, these would indicate
more liquidity in the market and more information, suggesting that the market would be likely to incorporate
more information into prices and do so efficiently, leading to better calibration.
Our results show that neither volume variable has a significant effect on calibration of the market prices.
In our data set, the 10th and 25th percentiles for Market Volume are 269 and 858, respectively. This may
provide some guidance for corporate prediction markets, which are often characterized by relatively low
volumes. According to our results, low volume appears not to introduce additional systematic bias in market
prices, but low volume may still require a substantial amount of trading for a corporate market.
6 Economic Analysis
The previous analysis has shown that prediction market prices can be significantly miscalibrated. Does this
imply that one can design investment strategies to exploit the bias to achieve positive economic returns? To
test for this we divided our sample into two halves. The first subset includes markets that began between the
22nd of August 2002 and the 14 of January 2005 (median starting date in our dataset). The second subset
consists of markets that began between the 15th of January 2005 and the 6th of February 2007.
A nonparametric analysis of the first sample revealed a significant S-shaped calibration curve, consistent
with the results for the entire dataset. This analysis suggests that one should buy when the price is between
0.08 and 0.10 or above 0.61 and sell when the price is between 0 and 0.08 or between 0.10 and 0.61. Call this
strategy A. Given the S-shape, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the actual calibration curve
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more in assets where expected profits are higher (like the Kelly criterion strategy). Therefore, these simple
strategies give us a conservative estimate of the possible profits.
When applying both strategies to the second half of the dataset, strategy A (B) yields an average rate of
return of 5.25 % (9.55 %). The fact that strategy B performs better than A suggests that the key issue is the
presence of a longshot bias. Moreover, the calibration curve estimated using the first sample deviates only
slightly from a simple longshot bias and is not significantly different. Thus, the strategies seem to produce
positive returns due to a persistent longshot bias.
The analysis above assumes a discount factor of one. As the discount rate increases, though, the rate of
return decreases very quickly. A discount rate of 10% yields a gain of 2.47 % on average with strategy A. A
discount rate of 15% completely cancels out the gains for strategy A, and a discount rate of 25% completely
cancels out the gains for strategy B. Thus, if traders have discount rates of this magnitude, there is no free
lunch; the miscalibration would be insufficient for traders to achieve excess returns.
Of course, we cannot say whether traders have high discount rates and hence that no systematic opportu-
nity of gain exists, or whether the discount rate only cancels a part of the possible gains, leaving some margin
for profitable strategies. A discount rate of 15-25% is somewhat high, even more given that the strategies
we tested are simplistic and underestimate the maximum level of profits which can be reached thanks to
the discrepancy between market prices are probabilities. Empirical studies of individual discount rates have
shown that they can be quite high (Andersen et al., 2008). In the case of prediction markets, even if the
trader cares less about an economic return per se, a high implicit discount rate may stem from the trader’s
desire to use his or her money to play repeatedly, which would indicate a high option value for the money.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Our study is the first to show that prediction markets are mechanically affected by time discounting. First,
the domain of beliefs compatible with an incentive to trade shrinks as the time to expiration increases. For
this reason, long-term prediction markets are typically characterized by a low level of trading volume. At
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contracts more likely to leave the market as the time to expiration of the market increases. As a consequence,
prices of long-term prediction markets are systematically biased toward 0.50.
Using a large dataset of prediction market prices, we have been able to estimate the calibration of market
prices more precisely than has been possible in previous studies. As predicted, prices on long-term prediction
markets exhibit systematic biases when considered as estimates of underlying probabilities. Our study casts
doubts on the use of prediction markets to forecast long-term events. Prediction markets for events occurring
a year or more in the future will either fail to generate a price or the price will be systematically biased.
In regards to these results, several questions can be raised relative to the possible limitations of our model
and relative to the meaning of the empirical finding.
Our model shows that, as a consequence of time discounting, calibration of prices improves as the time
to expiration decreases. One could also consider other explanations. For instance, calibration could be a
function of the amount of information available; more information regarding the likelihood of future events
might lead to better calibration. Our results show that the improvement in calibration over time can be
explained without appealing to information effects. However, understanding the possible relationship between
information and calibration in prediction market prices is an interesting question for future research.
Importantly, our model is unable to explain what happens for extreme prices, close to 0 or close to 1.
Our model and simulations predict an absence of extreme prices, even when traders beliefs are extreme.
When assuming rational traders only motivated by economic profit, time discounting should prevent trades
to occur in these ranges of prices as sellers, in the former case, and buyers, in the latter case, withdraw
from the market. For example, considering a situation where the interest rate on saving accounts is 5%,
there should be no trade for contracts whose prices are above 0.95 or below 0.05 where there is one year or
more until expiration. However, we observe transactions at these prices in markets that expire in a year or
more, and our empirical analysis has found an S-shaped calibration curve, over the whole range [0, 1]. The
economic unattractiveness of long-term markets leads to questions about the possible adverse selection of
traders’ motivations. These traders may have a utility of gambling per se, or the intent to affect the prices.
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a long-shot bias, could look similar to the result of Rubinstein on the pricing bias on short maturity out-
of-money calls. This bias has been interpreted as a form of favourite/longshot bias by later papers (Cain
et al., 2002; Berg and Rietz , 2002). However, the two results are different in nature. Rubinstein found a
bias, for out-of-money calls close to expirations. On the contrary, we find a bias for contracts which are far
away from expiration. In the case of out-of-money calls these are options which are unlikely to be profitable
but have the potential to provide a large profit with a very small probability. These longhot characteristics
could well increase buyers’ interest in such contracts, creating an increasing difference between the theoretical
price of the call and its observed price. In the literature on longshot bias, at least two different behavioural
explanations have been put forward to explain the existence of such a bias: a preference for skewness (Golec
and Tamarkin, 1998), and a propensity to overestimate small probabilities (Thaler and Ziemba, 1988). In
the case of our long term prediction market prices, we show that such a bias should naturally emerge due to
the standard preferences of traders (time preferences), which makes these contracts less appealing to sellers,
without the need to use non standard preferences.
Finally, our results can be used to look for ways to overcome the existing limitations of long-term predic-
tion markets. An obvious solution would be for long-term prediction markets to accommodate discounting
by paying interest on committed balances from traders. In fact, for balances over US $20,000, Intrade does
pay interest at the current ‘bank rate for interest-accruing checking accounts.’ In spite of this we still ob-
serve a more pronounced bias on long-term prediction markets. A possible reason is that traders’ subjective
discount rate may be significantly above the bank interest rate. This is in particular the case if traders have
a preference for gambling (Diecidue et al., 2004). Investing in a one-year contract amounts to losing the
opportunity to play repeatedly during the same period. Another possible reason is that traders with large
accounts may be more likely to be higher performing traders. High performing traders may have a positive
expected return on their trades, and, if so they would face a real (not a subjective) opportunity cost on
long-term contracts. If they have an expected return of just 2% per trade, in just 5 transactions they would
average a bit more than 10% return. This possible expected return is lost if their capital is frozen because
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payment to high balances is not enough, or that the interest rate paid on balances needs to be considerably
higher than the bank interest rate in order to eliminate bias in long-term prediction markets.
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